Abstract-We consider a network shared by noncooperative two types of users, group users and individual users. Each user of the first type has a significant impact on the load of the network, whereas a user of the second type does not. Both group users as well as individual users choose their routes so as to minimize their costs. We further consider the case that the users may have side constraints. We study the concept of mixed equilibrium (mixing of Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium). We establish its existence and some conditions for its uniqueness. Then, we apply the mixed equilibrium to a parallel links network and to a case of load balancing.
call the first type of per-class decision making a class-centralized optimization, and the second approach a class-individual optimization.
When all classes use a class-individual optimization approach then the natural optimization concept is the Wardrop equilibrium [22] . This concept was very much studied (e.g., [3] [4] [5] , [8] , [20] , and the references therein). Most of the work with this optimization approach has been done in the framework of road traffic. However, this concept has been also useful in the area of distributed computing [13] , [14] , and in telecommunication networks [6] . In the context of road traffic, an individual user (a "job" in our terminology) may correspond to a single driver, and the class may correspond to all the drivers of a given type of vehicle that have a given source and destination. In the context of distributed computing, a user may correspond to a single job that is sent to be processed at some computer in a computer-network. Finally, in the context of telecommunications, a single user may correspond to a single packet in networks in which the delay of each packet is minimized [6] . A generalized version of the Wardrop equilibrium which involves side constraints has been studied in [18] and the references therein.
When all classes use a class-centralized optimization approach then the optimization concept is the Nash equilibrium. There has been much recent interest in this framework in recent years [1] [2] [3] , [10] , [16] , [17] , [19] . In the context of road traffic, a class, or a group user, may correspond to a transportation company, or to a bus company; in both examples we may assume that the route of each vehicle is indeed determined by the company and not by the individual driver.
The concept of mixed equilibrium (ME) has been introduced by Harker [7] (and further applied in [23] to a dynamic equilibrium and in [11] to a specific load balancing problem with a completely symmetrical network). Harker has established the existence of the ME, characterized it through variational inequalities, and gave conditions for its uniqueness.
The first part of this paper consists of the mathematical model and the definition of mixed equilibria (Section II), then Sections III-IV establish the existence of equilibria under different approaches and assumptions, and Sections V and VI derive uniqueness conditions under conditions related to strict monotonicity. This part of our paper extends Harker's model [7] in several directions. i) A general cost function is considered, rather than the separable cost function given as the sum of link costs in [7] . This allows one to model routing games in which the performance measures are rejection probabilities of calls or loss probabilities of packets. Our general cost allows in particular different users to have different costs for the same links or the same paths, which allows to model priorities.
In some cases we explicitly introduce the term of per-user "service-rate" for this purpose. ii) We obtain existence and some uniqueness results for the case where the decisions of group users are constrained. This allows one to model side constraints, and to consider multiobjective problems faced by the users. For example, a group user might wish to find a strategy that minimizes its delay, and at the same time constraining its average loss probability to be below some bound.
In the second part of this paper, we obtain new sets of conditions for the uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium for the case where conditions of the type of strict monotonicity (such as those that are used in [7] ) do not apply. Some of the new conditions are obtained by making further assumptions on the structure of possible equilibria (Section VII) and others are obtained for specific topologies (Section VIII): the parallel link topology and load balancing models.
II. MIXED EQUILIBRIUM (ME): MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a general network. We denote the set of nodes, and the set of unidirectional links. 1 The unit entity that is routed through the network is called a job.
Each job has an origin-destination (O-D) pair as well as a service rate vector, . We denote the origin, or the source by and the destination by is an -vector ( is the number of elements of the set , i.e.,
). The interpretation of can be the speed at which job is processed in link and we assume that . Each user has a certain amount of jobs to route from a source to a destination , we call this amount the flow demand of the user for the O-D pair and we denote it by . The network is used by two types of users. The first type of users, referred to as group users have to route a large amount of jobs. The choices made by each of these users have a significant impact on the load of the network, and then on the delays that any other user can expect. We denote by the set of group users. Each user is characterized by • one service rate vector ; • a set of O-D pairs ; • a vector of demands denotes the rate of jobs of this class that have to be shipped from to . (Note that having several sources and destinations allows in particular to handle multicast applications, in which several destinations are associated with a single source).
The second type of users, referred as individual users, have a single job to route through the network from a given source to a given destination, with a given service rate. There are infinitely many individual users and the routing choice of a single individual user has a negligible impact on the load of the system. Individual users can be classified according to the pair source-destination and the service rate associated to their jobs. We denote 1 A bidirectional link may be transformed into a network of unidirectional ones where some are of null cost (Appendix B), then the results presented in this paper are also valid in networks with both unidirectional and bidirectional links unless the assumptions impose that the links' cost functions are strictly increasing.
the set of classes of individual users. Each class of the second type is characterized by
• one O-D pair ; • one service rate vector ; • one flow demand (the "number" of users belonging to class ).
Note that since all jobs of class have the same service rate vector, we shall use to denote the service rate vector of any one of the jobs that belong to class .
Note also that the elements of the set or of the set can be considered as a class of jobs characterized by a set of pair(s) of source and destination and a service rate. Nevertheless the routing decision of all the jobs of is taken by a single decision maker, while the routing decision of any single job of is taken by the individual user who is paired with it. We denote by the set of all possible classes of jobs, , and assume that is finite. A path from to is a sequence of directed links that goes from to . For we denote by the set of possible paths for class , by the set of possible paths for class which go from to , and by the set of all possible paths . In this paper, we try to work as much as possible on paths (i.e., the decision is what fraction of traffic of each class has to be routed over each path; this is in contrast to the more restrictive models such as [19] in which the routing decisions are how much jobs to route to each outgoing link of each node; this second type of models implicitly assumes that all sequences of directed links that lead from a source to a destination are admissible paths). Nevertheless, it will be necessary, sometimes, to work on link models, i.e., at each node we shall allow each class to route all the flow that it sends through that node to any of the out-going links of that node. Therefore, we introduce two notations for the flows, one in term of paths and one in term of links.
Each decision maker (a class within or an individual user belonging to some class in ) has to choose a (set of) path(s) to route its job(s). For and ), we denote by the amount of jobs sent through path link by class . Note again that the meaning of is slightly different according to whether belongs to the set or . If , then is the amount of jobs of user sent through , if represents the amount of individual users of class that choose path to ship their unique job. Depending on the context, we will denote by , the strategy of class , either the vector of path flows, or the vector of link flows, where is the number of paths (resp. links) in the set . Let be the flow configuration, i.e., is the vector , where , and be the set of possible (the "total" strategy set).
It will sometimes be necessary to distinguish in a routing profile of the part due to the group users, and the part due to the classes of individual users. We will then write , where corresponds to the choice of the group users, and corresponds Remark: Wardrop equilibrium condition is equivalent to (1) and , where .
III. EXISTENCE OF ME THROUGH VARIATIONAL INEQUALITIES
In this section, we present a simple variational inequality method to establish the existence of ME in the case of no extra constraints under general conditions on the cost functions for both types of classes. (An introduction to variational inequality methods may be found in [15] ). More precisely, Let and define the (total) strategy set as follows:
Assumptions:
• 
Proof:
is a nonempty, bounded, convex set, is a continuous mapping on , then there exists a solution to (6) (see [15, Ch. 1, Th. 3.1].
IV. EXISTENCE OF ME: A FIXED POINT APPROACH
In this section we relax the assumptions on the cost functions of the group users but restrict the cost functions of the individual users. With these new assumptions we obtain the existence of the ME (in a setting that allows one to include extra constraints) using the following approach. It is well known that one may compute the Wardrop equilibrium by transforming the problem into an equivalent optimization problem (as if there were only one decision maker) by transforming the costs in the network, see [20] and the references therein. In our setting of ME we shall thus i) transform in a similar way the optimization problem faced by all individual users into an optimization problem of a new equivalent single group user by transforming the cost in a similar way as is done for the Wardrop equilibrium. ii) Then, we will be faced with a game problem of group users only, for which we shall use Rosen's existence theorem [21] .
Let be the cost function of the link , this function is used only for the individual users. For any individual user , we defined the cost function of path as follows:
Assumptions:
• is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of .
• .
• is a continuous function of and is convex in .
• is continuous and increasing in . • for every system flow configuration , if not all costs of group users are finite then at least one class, with infinite cost can change its own flow configuration to make its cost finite, and similarly, an individual user has always a path of finite cost that it can use. These assumptions will be imposed in the rest of the paper. They imply that the policies of the group users may be constrained, since we do not assume that is an orthogonal set. Thus, the choice of policies by some group users may restrict the set of policies available to other group users.
Define where by where if otherwise.
Observe that is convex in ( is increasing) and continuous in and .
Introduce the convex minimization program with respect to (7)
Lemma IV.1: Either the convex program (7) has an optimal solution which satisfies (1) Remark: If we wish to include constraints that involve also the individual users, such as add constraints on the links capacities (which then involves constraints on all users) then the condition of Wardrop equilibrium (all the paths used are of same cost) may not hold anymore. Nevertheless, Larsson and Patriksson in [18] show that the program with respect to the new strategy set leads to another kind of equilibrium (which they call generalized Wardrop equilibrium. In this case, we can also apply our Lemma IV.1 [21, Th. 1] to obtain the existence of a "generalized mixed equilibrium."
V. UNIQUENESS OF ME: ROSEN'S TYPE CONDITION
Definition: Let be a vector, then is diagonally strictly increasing (DSI) for and for some if for any and we have or equivalently where (
The notion of DSI comes from the diagonal strict convexity (DSC) of [21] In fact, Rosen introduces the DSC for a maximization problem, when we talk about a minimization problem we have to reverse the inequality in order to obtain convexity. The DSC is a condition on the derivatives , that we cannot apply in our case to the cost functions of individual users, that's why we introduce the DSI. Note that DSI is equivalent to DSC. In the previous section we considered general convex, compact sets
. In this section, we need that be orthogonal, then we restrict to sets that can be described as follows. Let , where for any is a bounded, closed and convex set defined by the following:
• , where , is a convex function of , continuously differentiable, and (for ) is a constant; • . Then, is an orthogonal constraint set, which is convex.
Remark: may represent (for ) the positivity constraints, the flow conservation constraints and some "extra" constraints. For positivity and demand constraints are explicitly described.
We introduce the following assumptions.
Assumptions:
• There exists an interior point in the set of constraints which are not linear.
• Wherever finite, is continuously differentiable in (which imposes that is continuous in ). The last inequality is due to (12) and (16) . By (11), we have . By (15) and (16) . Then all mixed equilibria have the same utilization on links and moreover is unique. Proof: It may easily be seen that, up to reindexing of rows and columns, equals , and the required conclusion follows from Theorem V.2 and V.1.
Example: Linear Costs: To illustrate Theorem V.1, we consider the following cost structure, for which uniqueness has already been obtained in [7] using an alternative approach. Define the cost functions as follows:
• , where and ; • ; • . Indeed, in such a case, we have where denotes the -dimensional vector with entries all 1 and is the diagonal matrix with 1 everywhere on its diagonal, except at position where it is a 0. For any is a symmetric positive-definite matrix. Note that this network is a special case of equal service rates. One may easily find examples of networks with linear costs but different service rates where one cannot satisfy the hypothesis of Corollary V.3. In the next section we deal with such cases and we obtain a result on uniqueness for the links utilization.
VI. UNIQUENESS OF ME: LINEAR COSTS
We next obtain uniqueness of the utilization of some of the links in general networks with linear costs allowing for prioritizations through different service rates (thus extending the uniqueness results of [7] ).
Assumptions:
• We define the cost function of user as follows:
• is linear and increasing. We make the following assumption on the links.
• The set is composed of two disjoint sets of links i)
, for which are strictly increasing; ii)
, for which are constant (independent of ). 
Remark

VII. UNIQUENESS OF ME: POSITIVE FLOWS
The first theorem of this section shows under quite general conditions that if the global load on some links are the same under two equilibria, then also the flows of each user on these links are the same for the group users. Under more restrictive conditions, the second theorem in the section then, which extends [19, Th. 3.3], establishes conditions for the uniqueness of the global load at equilibrium.
Assumptions:
, for which are constant (independent of ).
• All the individual users are grouped in a unique class, denoted , then we have .
•
The service rate can be represented as , and is finite for all , and . • At each node, each class may reroute all the flow that it sends through that node to any of the out-going links of that node.
• the cost function on link for user satisfies
• is continuous and increasing and is continuously differentiable wherever finite.
• is the amount of traffic of class that enters the network at node , if this quantity is negative this means that traffic of class leaves node at an amount of . We assume that . Note that in this section, the cost functions on links for the group users, , may be different of those used by individual users, ; while in the previous section we required that both types of users have the same ones, i.e., . For each node , we denote by the set of its in-going links, and by the set of its out-going links. For each node we have the following demand-conservation constraint In order to minimize cost functions, we introduce the Lagrangian function where is the vector of Lagrange multipliers for class . Then for to be a mixed equilibrium the following conditions on group users are necessary for any there exists such that for any (23) We have
With , (23) can be rewritten as (24)
Remark: For is strictly increasing in both of its arguments.
Definition:
is the set of links such that for any . Note that the results of (25) and (27) are in fact identical as well as those of (26) The first inequality follows from the monotonicity and the convexity of for . The second inequality holds in fact for each pair (and not just for the sum). Indeed, for this relation holds with equality due to (29). This is also the case for , since in that case . Consider next the case . Then, we have A symmetric argument establishes the case . We finally establish the last equality in (30)
Since for all (resp. is increasing (resp. strictly increasing), we conclude from (30) that for all links in . The first part of the theorem is established. From Theorem VII.1, we conclude that . Thus, the theorem is established. Remark: The above Theorem extends [19, Th. 3.3] . The latter first establishes, under a more restrictive setting, the uniqueness of global link flows. Then it proceeds to conclude the uniqueness of the actual flows by hinting at an argument different than Theorem VII.1, taken from the proof of [19, Th. 2.1], which deals with the case of parallel links. We have not been able to reconstruct that argument, as it uses the fact that the sum of link flows of each user between two nodes does not depend on the equilibrium; this indeed is trivially true in the case of a parallel link topology, but one still needs to show that this extends to general topology. Our Theorem VII.1, of course, implies this.
VIII. UNIQUENESS OF ME FOR SPECIFIC TOPOLOGIES
We establish below the uniqueness of ME in networks with specific topologies: a network of parallel links, and two load balancing models from [10] . The uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for these models in the equal service rate case has been established in [19, Th. 2.1], [10, Th. 5.1], and [9] . For the load balancing networks, uniqueness and characterization of the ME has been derived in [11] for the case of a completely symmetric network. We now introduce the following.
• is a continuous function, convex in .
• Wherever finite, is continuously differentiable in . We denote .
• depends of two arguments and and is strictly increasing in both of them.
A. Parallel Links
In a network with parallel links, all the users have the same origin and the same destination, and moreover each link is a path and vice-versa. Then we have
. Even for such a simple network, and even if we took equal service rates, the conditions in Harker [7] or the DSI condition are typically not satisfied. Indeed, it is shown in [19] that these type of conditions do not hold in the special case of two links, two group users (with no individual users), and link costs that are of the type of an M/M/1 queue, except for very low traffic demands. where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of in its second argument. Now, since is nondecreasing in its first argument, this implies that , and (35) is established. This inequality contradicts our nonemptiness assumption on , and then . By symmetry it follows that the set is also empty. Thus, it has been established that (40) i.e., all mixed equilibria have the same utilization of links.
So it is now sufficient to establish that in order to prove the theorem. Equation (35) argument that does not hold as well. Finally, we have for . Combined with (40), this implies by (35) and (36) that for all and the lemma is proved.
B. Load Balancing With Unidirectional Links
We consider a model consisting of two processors, and , and a two-way communication lines, and , between them (see Fig. 1 ); the two processors can be seen as two links, and , between two different sources, and , and a unique destination (see Fig. 2 ).
This network can be reformulated in a network of parallel links ( [9] ), then we can apply Lemma VIII.1 and obtain the same uniqueness than previously for this model of load balancing. This result can be extended to a model of processors with a two-way communication lines between each couple of processors (there are exactly lines).
C. Load Balancing With a Communication Bus
We now consider a model made up of two processors, and , and a communication bus, , between them (see Fig. 3 ); the two processors can be seen as two links, and , between two different sources, and , and a unique destination, (see Fig. 4 ).
Since a bidirectional link can be transformed in a network of unidirectional links (Appendix B) mixed equilibria in networks with unidirectional and bidirectional links exist.
Notation: We denote for by the part of class whose origin is , i.e., and by the initial flow demand of user at node . In this model, there exist four paths, . Proof: See Appendix C
IX. CONCLUSION
We have focused in this paper the ME concept introduced in [7] and studied it under more general assumptions on the costs and for more general setting of optimization (which allows one to use constraints). ME involves groups that contain a continuum of users, where some of the groups have a single decision maker for the whole group and others have a decision maker per user. We further established uniqueness of the mixed equilibrium by either restricting to specific topologies or making some extra assumptions on the equilibrium flows.
A future research direction would be to add also extra constraints on the individual users (see [18] ). We have not included these constraints here (except for a Remark in the end of Section IV) since in their presence, the Wardrop principles need not hold anymore. For example, consider a network of two parallel links having both load independent costs, and in which there is a capacity constraint on a link with the lowest cost. If the latter link cannot accommodate all the flow then we would expect the outcome of individual optimization to yield the full utilization of that link and partial utilization of the other one. Hence, the costs of different links (paths) that carry positive flow are not the same, thus violating Wardrop principle.
APPENDIX
A. Constraints in General Networks
In a general network, the configuration flows which are feasible are the which satisfy 
B. Relation Between a Bidirectional Link and a Network of Unidirectional Ones
A bidirectional link may always be expressed as an equivalent network of unidirectional ones. Indeed, consider a bidirectional link between nodes and , where the cost function of this link is , and where is the aggregate flow through link . Then we can transform this link in the network of unidirectional links in Fig. 5 with the cost functions: and . These two subnetworks are not equivalent, since in the second one a user can go from to (of from to ) with the cost which is not possible in the first one. Neverthelesss, they become equivalent if we add a constraint in the second network excluding cycles. This does not affect the equilibrium, since at equilibrium the paths and will not be used (as long as costs are nonnegative, of course). The first and last equalities follow from the definition of . The other equality as well as the first inequality follow from the Kuhn Tucker conditions, whereas the last inequality follows from the monotonicity assumption . Using again , this time for the first argument, we conclude from the fact that (46) holds. Thus, we try the follwoing instead of a). b)
C. Proof of Lemma
. (46) 
